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An Attempt to Formulate a Preliminary 
Definition of the Validity of Norms1
Introductory Findings on Norms
The issue of validity in law has been and still is widely discussed in 
the literature on the subject.2 In this respect, I would like to propose a pre-
liminary definition of the validity of norms and compare it with the con-
ception of such a definition put forward by Leszek Nowak in the work 
referred to in the second footnote.
However, it will be necessary to start by making certain prelimi-
nary remarks on the understanding of norms. I assume here a linguis-
tic approach that places norms in the linguistic sphere. Thus, I consider 
each norm to be an expression of a specific language. There are a num-
ber of arguments in favour of such an assumption. First of all, norms 
are assigned a certain meaning and the issue of ambiguity of certain 
norms and the relationship of synonymity between norms is considered. 
In semiotics, the prevailing view is that of the meaning of expressions. 
1 This article is an English translation of excerpts contained in sections 1–2 of the first chap-
ter of my work entitled Derogacja norm spowodowana nowelizacyjną działalnością pra-
wodawcy. Próba eksplanacyjnego podejścia published by Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM 
in 2016, to which the Publishing House has given its consent. 
2 It would suffice to recall the following items from Polish theoretical and legal lit-
erature: W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa, Warszawa 1962; Z. Ziemba, Zwrot «norma 
N obowiązuje» w języku prawnym i prawniczym, „Studia Filozoficzne” 1963, no. 3–4, 
pp. 93–115; L. Nowak, Interpretacja prawnicza. Studium z metodologii prawoznawstwa, 
Warszawa 1973; J. Stelmach, Obowiązywanie prawa w sensie absolutnym i relatywnym, 
in: Teoria prawa. Filozofia prawa. Współczesne prawo i prawoznawstwo, Toruń 1998, 
pp. 315–327 or A. Grabowski, Prawnicze pojęcie obowiązywania prawa stanowionego. 
Krytyka niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa, Kraków 2009. 
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If we agree with this dominant view, then a norm carries meaning, or it 
may be ambiguous or synonymous to other norms only if it belongs to 
a set of expressions. Moreover, although the theory of law makes a fine 
distinction between norms and provisions understood as sentences in 
a grammatical sense, this does not exclude that a certain provision may 
turn out to be a norm. Since sentences in the grammatical sense are ex-
pressions, and provisions are sentences in the grammatical sense, a pro-
vision may only be a norm if it (the latter) is an expression. It would be 
difficult to consider norms identical to provisions as expressions, and to 
deny other norms this qualification. Finally, the definition of truth based 
on the concept of fulfillment refers to sentences in a logical sense un-
derstood as expressions. Of course, norms are not sentences in a logical 
sense. Excluding norms from the set of expressions would determine 
their lack of logical value, but such a conclusion would be the result of 
assigning them a certain ontological status. On the other hand, a position 
denying norms logical value because of their content, despite having 
recognized them as expressions, seems to be ontologically uncommit-
ted. Since norms are expressions, they cannot be statements understood 
as actions. Nor may they be the meanings of utterances, meanings of 
expressions or meanings of normative sentences. 
At the same time, norms turn out to be complex expressions resulting 
from the attachment of expressions with specific content to normative 
operators. Since normative operators are divided into prescriptive and 
prohibitory only, each norm is either a prescriptive or a prohibitory one. 
An expression attached to a normative operator consists of a hypothesis 
and a direction. The hypothesis is the initial fragment of the argument 
of the normative operator comprising the identification of the address-
ee of the norm and the description of the circumstances the occurrence of 
which makes the norm applicable. This specification may, in particular, 
consist in identifying the initial moment upon which the obligation of 
the addressee of the norm is updated. It may also be the indication of the 
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final moment after which the obligation set by the norm becomes obso-
lete and is no longer binding the addressee of the norm. It may also con-
sist in identifying the beginning and the end of the period during which 
the addressee of the norm must act in the way it is obligated by the norm. 
Whereas in the direction of the norm, there is an indication of the action 
to be taken by the addressee, by virtue of being the object of the ad-
dressee’s obligation, as long as the latter is in a situation falling within 
the scope of that norm. What cannot be ruled out altogether is that the 
direction of the norm will include a more or less precise description of 
how such an action should be performed. And so this will suffice for the 
understanding of norms.
The Preliminary Definition of the Validity of Norms
In order to provide a preliminary definition of the validity of norms, 
I will use the idealization method widely used in empirical sciences.3 
In the approach proposed here, there are eight idealizing assumptions 
that make up the ideal legislator. 
According to the first of them:
(Z1)   X is the only legislator in world history. 
This assumption introduces a number of simplifications. First of all, 
it eliminates the so-called multicentricity of the legal system arising 
from the fact that it is made up of laws created independently by sev-
eral subjects. Moreover, it eliminates the dependence of the system in 
question on international law, on another concurrent legal system, or on 
the normative activity of various social organizations tolerated by the 
legislator. Finally, this assumption eliminates the influence of previous 
systems on the legal system in question.
3 The conception of idealization as the fundamental procedure in empirical sciences was 
most fully proposed by L. Nowak in his work: The Structure of Idealization, Dordrecht 
1979.
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According to the second assumption:
(Z2)  if X wants to achieve a certain state of affairs, he sepa-
rately orders its implementation, and if X wants to avoid 
a certain state of affairs, then he separately prohibits its 
implementation. 
This assumption removes the extremely complicated issue of the en-
tailment relationship between norms and the no less complex issue of 
instrumental subordination to norms.
Under the next assumption:
(Z3)  the legal system created by X is shaped exclusively by en-
acting laws in a manner that is always, invariably, the same.
Also this assumption introduces two simplifications. Firstly, it elimi-
nates all other factors that shape the law, apart from the law enacting 
process, such as precedent, custom, change in the rules of interpretation 
applied, change of territorial division, change in the type of State or 
desuetudo. Secondly – but no less importantly – this assumption elimi-
nates those changes in the very approach to enacting laws that may have 
a significant impact on the shape of the legal system based on it. 
According to the next assumption:
(Z4)  the invariable language of X is a language in the sense of 
its logical theory. 
This assumption also introduces two simplifications. First of all, the lan-
guage of the legislator is to be a language in the sense in which it is 
understood in the logical theory of language. The language understood 
in this way turns out to be free of any imperfections, and thus is free of 
ambiguity. As a matter of fact a legislator who meets the above assump-
tion is incapable of formulating ambiguous provisions, even if, for some 
reasons, he would wish to do so. Moreover, the language of the legisla-
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tor remains unchanged, which means that he will always be using the 
same language. 
Based on the next assumption:
(Z5)  t he legal system created by X is not subject to control.
Therefore, the system is not subjected to any review, except of course to the 
control exercised by the legislator himself. It is also worth noting that 
the third of the above assumptions, by virtue of which the system cre-
ated by the legislator is shaped solely by enacting, does not exclude the 
possibility of influencing this system by controlling actions, as the very 
operation of making laws may be subject to such actions.
According to the next assumption:
(Z6)  the legal system created by X is not based on sanctions.
Therefore, none of the norms in such a system is a norm sanctioning any 
other norm. Of course, a system that does not contain sanctioning norms 
does not lose its reputation as a legal system. Nor does it mean that the 
norms of such a system are not binding on their addressees or that the ad-
dressees of such norms never observe them. It only means that the leg-
islator did not entrust any specifically designated bodies with the func-
tion of administering sanctions for exceeding the norms of the system 
he created by addressing sanctioning norms to them, but he undertook 
this task himself, leaving himself free to react to information about the 
improper conduct of his subjects. 
In accordance with the penultimate assumption:
(Z7)  X enacts only one normative act.
Hence all legal solutions are contained in one normative act only. This 
does not prejudge its content, which, however, must be such that no ad-
ditional supplementation with decisions contained in other normative 
acts will be needed.
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The formulation of the last assumption requires first of all the fol-
lowing determination of the normative construct: (1) each norm is 
a normative construct, (2) if A and B are normative constructs for-
mulated in the same language, then A.B is a normative construct. 
As can be seen, this determination has a recursive form. According 
to (1), which is qualified as an initial clause, all norms are normative 
constructs. According to (2), which is an inductive clause, two con-
structs formulated in the same language and combined with a dot also 
constitute a normative construct. Thus, the above determination estab-
lishes the set of all normative constructs. And now, the last idealizing 
assumption may be formulated: 
(Z8)  the normative act enacted by X is a normative construct.
This means that the act contains only norms, and they are norms for-
mulated in the same language. The normative act is therefore limited to 
the basic text only, and does not include the title of the entire text, the 
headings of larger editorial units, or the numbering of the provisions. 
A subject that meets all of the above requirements will be referred to as 
the ideal legislator. 
After these clarifications, we can now proceed to formulating the 
following definition:
(D1)  ⋀n⋀s⋀t {n is valid in s created by the ideal legislator at t 
≡ ⋁y [n is a part of y ˄  ⋁t’ (t’ is earlier than t ˄  y is enacted 
in t’ by the ideal legislator who is the creator of s)]}, 
where the range of variable “n” is a set of norms, the range of variable 
“s” is a set of legal systems, the range of variables “t” and “t’” is a set 
of days, and the range of variable “y” is a set of a subset of normative 
constructs in which there are no sanctioning norms. In other words, ac-
cording to the above definition, a given norm is valid in a legal system 
created by the ideal legislator on a specific date only if it is a part of 
a normative act previously created by that legislator. 
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As can be seen, D1 is a normal definition, in which the role of the defi-
nitional conjunction is played by the connective of equivalence derived 
from a sentential calculus. Since the remaining variables and constants 
contained in it also belong to this calculus or to the first order predicate 
calculus, this definition is based on the classical logical calculus. It also 
fulfils all the internal requirements of formal correctness imposed on such 
definitions. Firstly, the expression defined in it appears only in the definien-
dum, but not in the definiens. Secondly, each of the variables present in 
the definiendum appears there only once. Thirdly, all free variables in the 
definiens are also free variables in the definiendum. Variables “y” and “t’” 
do not appear in the definiendum but they do appear in the definiens as 
bound variables. Since a defined expression belongs to the same language 
as the definition containing it, it is therefore an intralingual definition. 
The first variable attached to the defined predicate is the variable “n”, 
whose range is a set of norms. Thus, according to the definition proposed 
here, valid objects are norms. Therefore we cannot talk about the valid-
ity of the law, the validity of a legal system or the validity of a provision. 
The second variable attached to the defined predicate is the variable “s”, 
whose range is a set of legal systems. The need to attach this variable to 
the predicate causes this predicate to display so called relative validity 
i.e. the validity in a system created by a particular legislator, differing 
in this respect from the absolute validity that ignores this relativization. 
The third variable attached to the defined predicate is the variable “t”, 
which determines the temporal relativization of validity. I assume that 
such a smallest temporal unit of the duration of validity is one day. 
The above definition D1 indicates that, in the simplest case, the va-
lidity of a norm is determined solely by the enactment of a normative act 
containing it. What is more, the enacting subject is an ideal legislator and 
consequently the only legislator enacting just that one normative act. 
Therefore an ideal legislator cannot perform his function by virtue of the 
competence conferred on him by some other higher ranking legislator, 
or by virtue of the competence that he has conferred on himself earlier, 
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in another normative act. Thus he may only be characterized in political 
terms as a subject that has power over individuals and who is therefore, 
using his authority, coercion or persuasion, capable of practically forcing 
them to respect the limitations he imposed on them. Consequently, ei-
ther a single individual with extraordinary authority or a group of people 
strong enough to force others to respect the limitations imposed on them 
may be the ideal legislator. It may also be a whole community which, as 
a result of the mutual persuasion exercised by its members, enacts an act 
considered by each of them as their own. When the enacting is done by 
a subject that is not a legislator, no source of law is created as a result.
Since the ideal legislator has not taken over any regulations from 
anyone, nor has he himself issued any normative act beforehand, he is 
not bound by any provisions determining the course of the enacting pro-
cess. The manner of enacting is determined exclusively by the culture of 
the community for which he is the legislator. The “enacting in the nar-
row sense … in our legal culture does not require the formulation of any 
utterance, but is done by an act of voting by authorized subjects (in the 
case of a collegial legislator) or by the signing of a draft normative act 
by an authorized subject if the legislator is a single person.”4 As can be 
seen, in the simplest circumstances proper for an ideal legislator, enact-
ing boils down to the performance of one action, which is not too com-
plicated. The legislator either performs this action, and then enacting 
occurs, or does not perform this action, and then no enacting takes place. 
Because D1 makes the validity of a norm conditional upon a non-grad-
ual enacting process of the normative act that contains it, the validity of 
the norm is also non-gradual. A given norm is either valid or not valid 
on a specific date in the indicated legal system. 
In its entirety, D1 is an expression formulated in a language that for 
an ideal legislator is a metalanguage. According to Z4, this language is 
4 S. Wronkowska, O źródłach prawa i aktach normatywnych raz jeszcze, in: Prawo pry-
watne czasu przemian. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Profesorowi Stanisławowi 
Sołtysińskiemu, ed. A. Nowicka, Poznań 2005, p. 128. 
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a language in the sense of its logical theory; consequently the language 
of the definition in question also has this status. It is therefore made up of 
linguistic rules5 which are divided into syntactic rules and semantic rules. 
The syntactic rules are formation rules and deductive rules. The formation 
rules include vocabulary rules and grammatical rules, the latter cover-
ing rules that determine grammatical categories and rules that determine 
the way in which complex expressions are built. One of the vocabulary 
rules qualifies the sequence defined in D1 as a word of this language. 
And one of the grammatical category rules classifies this word as a triadic 
predicate, whereas one of the rules determining how complex expression 
are built allows a sentence to be built from this predicate, once three sin-
gular terms have been attached to it. In turn, deductive rules are divided 
into axiomatic rules and inference rules. The former include, inter alia, 
a rule that qualifies all definitions as theses of a given language. D1 is 
therefore a thesis of the language in which it is formulated, and thus 
is an analytical sentence in that language. As a result, definition D1 is true 
in every model of that language. The inference rules include a rule which 
qualifies as theses of this language all the logical consequences of its the-
ses. What I also assume is that another inference rule qualifies as a thesis 
every equivalence of sentences that differ only insofar as that in one of 
them there occurs a defined expression, and in the other one – a defining 
expression in the definition which is already a thesis of this language. 
In a language thus constituted, a definition ensures the synonym-
ity of the expression defined in it with the expression that defines it. 
According to the conception assumed here,6 two sentences are synony-
mous in a given language when the implications created from them are 
theses of this language. In turn two expressions that are not sentenc-
es are synonymous in a given language when any two sentences of this 
language, differing solely in these expressions, are synonymous in it. 
5 For more on this see J. Kmita, Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauk, Warszawa 1973, chap-
ters II and III. 
6 V. J. Kmita, Wykłady…, pp. 59–62. 
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While the meaning of an expression in a given language is the feature of 
this expression and of all and only expressions of this language that are 
synonymous to it. 
Therefore, let us consider the phrase “«Every driver driving a vehicle 
on a public road must drive on the right side of the road» is valid in le-
gal system A, created by the ideal legislator at 26 September 2020” and 
the sentence “⋁y [«Every driver driving a vehicle on a public road must 
drive on the right-hand side of the road»” is a part of y ˄ ⋁t’ (t’ is earlier 
than 26 September 2020 ˄ y is enacted in t’ by the ideal legislator who 
created legal system A)].” The only difference between them is that in the 
former there is the predicate defined in D1: “…is valid in…created by 
the ideal legislator…at…”; while in the latter, there is the defining phrase 
in this definition: “⋁y [… is a part of y ˄ ⋁t’ (t’ is earlier than … ˄ y is 
enacted in t’ by the ideal legislator who created…).” Because by virtue of 
the axiomatic rule mentioned above, D1 is the thesis of the language in 
question, therefore – based on the other of the inference rules mentioned 
above – its thesis is also the equivalence built from these sentences as its 
arguments. Thus the first of the mentioned inference rules qualifies both 
implications that logically follow from this equivalence as theses. Thus 
the sentences formulated above are synonymous in their language. 
A legislator who meets the previously formulated idealizing assump-
tions is an ideal legislator thanks to the simplicity and the absence of any 
complications hindering the resolution of various research problems. He is 
not, however, the ideal legislator because he is perfect in creating the best, 
most effective, internal, and fully consistent legal system. The system cre-
ated by the ideal legislator does not therefore preclude the validity of norms 
that are in various ways improper. From this point of view, the norms of the 
system created by the ideal legislator do not differ from those of the real 
legal system burdened with various shortcomings. First of all, it cannot 
be excluded that in the system created by the ideal legislator, there will be 
valid norms whose scope of application also covers situations arising prior 
to the enactment of the act containing them.
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Secondly, such a system does not preclude either the validity of 
norms which, for logical or empirical reasons, are not feasible, or the va-
lidity of norms the realization of which, for logical or empirical reasons, 
turns out to be necessary. There are some arguments in favour of the ad-
missibility of the validity of such norms. First of all, this is because the 
legislator sometimes does enact a normative act containing such norms. 
What I mean here is not only the infamous instruction prohibiting pas-
sengers from getting off the plane during the flight, but also normative 
acts from the early post-war years imposing on individual farmers obli-
gations to supply crops, which were impossible for the majority of them 
to fulfil. These obligations were so exorbitant that they exceeded the 
production capacity of most individual holdings. They were neverthe-
less enforced with all ruthlessness, and many of the farmers unable to 
fulfil them were sentenced to several months of imprisonment. The con-
victions were so determined that they could return to their field work in 
the spring. What is more, sometimes the legislator himself introduces 
provisions which eliminate obligations that cannot be met. For example, 
under Article 387 § 1 of the Civil Code, a contract that is impossible to 
perform is void. If, by the definition itself, a rule ordering (or prohibit-
ing) its addressee to perform (refrain from performing) a specific act for 
logical or empirical reasons were to be excluded, then this rule would 
be superfluous. Its presence in the civil code demonstrates that the very 
definition does not exclude the validity of such norms. 
Thirdly, in a system created by the ideal legislator, the existence 
of mutually incompatible or even mutually contradictory norms is 
not barred. If the ideal legislator included two mutually contradictory 
norms in an act that he enacted, both would apply in the system he has 
created. Due to the assumptions idealizing the legislator, the only in-
direct but important argument in favour of such a possibility in Poland 
is provided by the construction of the effects of the rulings of the Con-
stitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny) adopted in our country. 
This organ adjudicates on the conformity of certain normative acts 
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with the Constitution and other indicated normative acts, such acts 
cease to be valid and binding upon the verdict of the Constitutional 
Tribunal coming into force. However, since until that moment a nor-
mative act challenged as unconstitutional or inconsistent with other 
normative acts had been the source of law, there were norms valid and 
binding in our legal system and covered by the act in question that 
were inconsistent with the norms that were also valid in that system 
at that time, contained in those acts. 
I would also like to establish the relationship between the definition 
of the validity of norms proposed here to legal positivism. In its simplest 
form, legal positivism boils down to the thesis on the separation of law 
from morality. Therefore, this thesis would claim that the definition of the 
validity of norms does not contain a criterion that would make a norm’s 
entry into this relationship contingent upon the fulfilment of any moral 
requirements. Since D1 indeed does not contain such a criterion, the con-
ception presented here qualifies as a manifestation of legal positivism thus 
understood. Therefore, in the system created by the ideal legislator, the 
valid norms would not only be norms with scopes of application extend-
ing to situations occurring even before the enactment of a normative act 
containing these norms, and norms that for logical or empirical reasons 
are unrealizable, or norms whose realization for these very reasons is in-
evitable, as well as mutually incompatible norms, but also norms that are 
extremely improper. A system containing such norms would be immoral 
and therefore reprehensible, but it would not, for this very reason, cease 
to be a legal system. 
In a slightly more complicated approach, legal positivism may be 
identified with a set of two theses, namely a thesis on the separation of law 
and morality as pointed out above, and a thesis on social facts. The latter 
thesis, in a stronger version, states that the enacting of the law under-
lying the validity of each separate norm present in a given legal system 
is a social fact. It is easy to note that the standpoint presented here respects 
this thesis in this version because according to D1 a norm is valid in a sys-
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tem created by an ideal legislator only when it is present in a normative act 
enacted by him. The point of view presented here also respects this thesis 
in its weaker version, which states that the legal system as a whole is the 
result of the enacting performed by a sovereign legislator. The assump-
tions constituting the ideal legislator include, among other things, Z3, ac-
cording to which the system created by the ideal legislator is exclusively 
the effect of enacting, while under Z1 this legislator is the only one in the 
history of the world, which guarantees him total sovereignty in this area. 
In an even more complicated approach to legal positivism, a third 
thesis is added to the above two ones that characterize it. It is a thesis 
on the social effectiveness of the law, and one that is also respected by 
the point of view presented here. It must also be remembered here that 
I refer to the political characteristics of the legislator, according to which 
this role may only be played by a subject with real power over his sub-
jects, enabling him to enforce appropriate actions on them. 
As can be seen, my research proposal is marked by three theses that 
are crucial for legal positivism. Already this is sufficient to qualify it as 
a fundamentally positivist conception. It therefore belongs to a trend 
considered by many researchers to be leading and capable of absorbing 
new ideas, and one on which our law, the activity of the Constitutional 
Tribunal and the entire legal practice is basically founded. 
It should also be added that the preliminary definition of the validity 
of norms turns out to be relatively simple, as it is based on eight idealiz-
ing assumptions. As the assumptions are eliminated, the definition itself 
becomes more complicated. First of all, its definiens is expanded. Then, 
the entire definition is transformed into a recursive definition. These 
complications, however, are not the subject of my interest here. 
An Ideal Legislator and a Perfect Legislator
The proposal for a preliminary definition of the validity of norms pre-
sented here is not the first to use the idealization method for this purpose. 
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Many years ago such a concept was presented by Nowak in his earlier 
work Interpretacja prawnicza. Studium z metodologii prawoznawstwa 
(Legal Interpretation. Study of the methodology of jurisprudence), where 
he presented a number of related definitions. Now I would like to com-
pare these two proposals, taking into account, however, only the prelimi-
nary definition he formulated. I do not hesitate to point out that the ap-
proach presented by Nowak is a model that I tried to follow here, when 
I presented my own point of view above. The difference in the results ob-
tained using the same method is primarily due to the discrepancy between 
the intuitions we have taken into account. In making his proposal, Nowak 
relied on the intuitions nourished in this matter by legal dogmatics, which 
he was even doomed to do, since it was the first extensive treatment of 
the problem in the literature on the subject. My main goal is to capture the 
intuitions of the theorists of law connected with this issue. 
When comparing the two approaches, I will focus primarily on estab-
lishing similarities and differences in the sets of idealizing assumptions. 
Nowak introduced as many as seventeen of them, namely: (p1) the knowl-
edge of legislator L is not contradictory, (p2) the knowledge of legislator 
L is a system, that is, it covers all its own logical consequences, (p3) the 
knowledge of legislator L covers all the rules of the language in which 
the legislator formulates provisions, (p4) the knowledge of legislator L is 
the best justified knowledge from the point of view of the current state 
of science, (p5) legislator L’s preferences are asymmetric, (p6) legislator 
L’s preferences are transitive, (p7) legislator L’s assessments determining 
his preferences are a full system of morally just assessments, (p8) all the 
provisions issued by legislator L are norms, (p9) legislator L orders people 
what to do only by formulating appropriate provisions, (p10) all the pro-
visions issued by legislator L are practically autonomous, i.e. there is no 
need to issue separate implementing provisions for any of them, (p11) all 
the provisions issued by legislator L are axiologically effective, which 
means that achieving by means of a provision the prescribed (avoidance 
of the forbidden) state of affairs is the ultimate goal of legislator L, and 
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is not to be only a means by which he can achieve (avoid) another state 
of affairs, (p12) all provisions are issued by legislator L collectively, in 
a single normative act, (p13) legislator L has not taken over any previ-
ous provisions, (p14) legislator L does not enact provisions of normative 
competence, (p15) the legal force of all the provisions issued by legislator 
L is equal, (p16) legislator L has issued all provisions in a single norma-
tive act, (p17) if legislator L wants to achieve a certain state of affairs, he 
issues a separate provision ordering its implementation. A legislator who 
meets all these idealizing assumptions is called the perfect legislator. 
It is easy to notice that, of the above, I adopted p16 and – having 
formulated it in my own language – introduced it as Z7, according to 
which X enacts only one normative act. Also Z3, under which the legal 
system created by X is shaped solely by enacting carried out in the same 
way, may be considered to be the faithful counterpart of p9, provided 
that the latter assumption is correctly expressed. It must not be a mat-
ter of formulating appropriate provisions, but of enacting normative 
acts that consist of these provisions, because only such an operation af-
fects the legal system. Also Z2 – which states that if X wants to achieve 
a specific state of affairs, he separately orders its implementation, and 
if X wants to avoid a specific state of affairs, he separately prohibits 
its implementation – must be regarded as the exact counterpart of p17. 
Contrary to what it may seem, this last assumption is not weaker than 
Z2, but is based on a slightly different vision of norms. Nowak con-
sidered the norms prohibiting the performance of relevant acts to be 
translatable into norms ordering the forbearance of such acts, and for 
this reason he only considered the latter. Here, however, I accept that 
norms are divided into norms that require certain acts to be performed 
and norms that prohibit certain acts, and with this division, norms of one 
kind cannot be easily replaced by norms of another kind. In turn, Z1, 
according to which X is the only legislator in world history, turns out 
to be stronger than p13. I consider this strengthening of idealization to 
be necessary because it allows, in the initial, simplest case scenario, the 
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removal from the field of consideration the complicated problem of the 
dependence of the legal system not only on its previous form, but also 
on the neighbouring systems, as well as the norms of various internal 
and external organizations supported or only tolerated by the legislator. 
In addition, it allows one to eliminate the phenomenon of multicentricity 
from the legal system, which was absent at the time when the conception 
analyzed here was created. Also Z8, which ensures that the act enacted 
by X is a normative construct, proves to be stronger than p8. Whilst, as 
a result of each of these assumptions, the act enacted by the legislator 
covers nothing else but norms, only the first assumption ensures that all 
the components of the normative act are formulated in one language. 
Again this strengthening of idealization seems essential, as it is only ow-
ing to idealization that we may speak about the language of valid norms 
and, consequently, the language of a normative act containing them. 
However, some of the assumptions that constitute the ideal legis-
lator do not have their counterparts among those that characterize the 
perfect legislator. Namely, there is no counterpart of Z6, according to 
which the legal system created by X is not based on sanctions. This 
omission results from a different view of the semiotic status of deci-
sions imposing sanctions. Sharing the opinions of many researchers,7 
Nowak assumed that the decision imposing a sanction contained an 
individual norm. Thus, the enactment of such a norm must be autho-
rized by a relevant norm of legislative competence. Since, under p14, 
the legislator does not enact provisions granting such competence, the 
problem of sanctioning norms also disappears. In my opinion, however, 
it is the authors who question the presence of an individual norm in judi-
cial decisions, including those imposing a sanction, who are right.8 Thus 
a separate idealizing assumption must remove all the complications that 
may arise in connection with sanctions.
7 See e.g. H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley 1970, p. 351. 
8 See e.g. K. Piasecki, Wyrok pierwszej instancji w postępowaniu cywilnym, Warszawa 1981, 
p. 95.
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The assumptions that constitute the perfect legislator also lack the 
counterpart of Z4, according to which the invariable language of X is a lan-
guage in the sense of its logical theory. I consider the absence ofa coun-
terpart of this assumption to be a certain oversight, because a legislator 
who is not bound by any language limits might include in the act that 
he has enacted norms formulated in different languages, while only those 
norms for which the predicate defined here were a meta-linguistic expres-
sion would have a chance of being valid. This seems counter-intuitive. 
Further, among the assumptions concerning the perfect legislator, there 
is no counterpart of Z5, either. Z5 states that the legal system created by 
X is not subject to control, however, the absence of this counterpart is 
understandable, because at least in our legal system such judicial review – 
entrusted to the Constitutional Tribunal – was introduced not so long ago.
Some of the assumptions that constitute the perfect legislator also lack 
their counterparts among the assumptions that characterize the ideal leg-
islator. Primarily, it is assumptions p1–p7 idealizing the knowledge and 
preferences of the legislator that do not have counterparts. It should there-
fore be pointed out that Nowak regarded legal interpretation as a variation 
of humanistic interpretation.9 Since the latter is based on the assumption 
that the subject of the action to be interpreted is rational, assumptions 
idealizing the subject’s initial knowledge and preferences must be made 
at the beginning. However, the preliminary definition of the validity of 
norms proposed here does not have such dependencies, hence the coun-
terparts of the above mentioned assumptions are unnecessary.
Also p10 has no counterpart among the assumptions concerning the 
ideal legislator. In this case, however, the reason for this discrepancy is 
different. As I have already pointed out, Nowak aimed to recreate the 
conception of the validity of norms, which is tacitly assumed by repre-
sentatives of legal dogmatics. Since their task is to improve the law com-
prehensively, they use such a conception of validity that allows them to 
9 On this type of explanation see J. Kmita, Z metodologicznych problemów interpretacji hu-
manistycznej, Warszawa 1971.
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perform this role as best as possible. And it is precisely the assumption 
that is being considered here that is part of this conception. When it is 
repealed, it allows, on the one hand, one to propose that the norms con-
tained in redundant implementing provisions are not valid and, on the 
other hand, to propose that the norms necessary for the functioning of 
those norms are valid, although the relevant implementing acts have not 
yet been enacted. Meanwhile, my proposal is based on the intuition of 
the theorists of law. These scholars are not tasked with improving the 
law but, at most, with explaining its shortcomings. That is why I am not 
introducing any counterpart to this assumption here. For the same rea-
son, I am not introducing any counterpart of p11. 
Among the assumptions that characterize an ideal legislator, there is 
no counterpart of p12 either. Nowak emphasized that, according to this as-
sumption, the legislator puts all provisions in collective normative acts 
and issues them periodically “once per one time unit (e.g. once a year).”10 
I consider this assumption superfluous since, according to p16 (which has 
a counterpart of Z7), the legislator enacts only one normative act. For 
the same reasons, I do not introduce the counterpart of p15 guarantee-
ing the equal power of all the provisions issued by the perfect legislator. 
In accordance with p16 (here Z7), the legislator enacts only one normative 
act, and the power of the provisions in one act is always the same. As-
sumptions p12 and p15 could at most be used after the repeal of p16 (here 
Z7) as its weakening, but they should not occur simultaneously with it. 
To a certain extent, the situation is similar with p14 which also has 
no counterpart here; p14 excludes the enacting by the perfect legislator 
of competence provisions. Zygmunt Ziembiński put forward the concep-
tion of competence norms comprising norms that confer legislative com-
petence as well as non-legislative competence.11 Following this author, 
Nowak assumed that the power to enact laws is conferred by a particular 
10 See L. Nowak, Interpretacja…, p. 56.
11 V. Z. Ziembiński, Kompetencja i norma kompetencyjna, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny 
i Socjologiczny” 1969, issue 4, pp. 23–41.
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type of norm which could therefore be present in an act enacted by a per-
fect legislator. To rule out this possibility, he introduced the aforemen-
tioned assumption. My attitude to the proposal put forward by Ziembiński 
is not so simple.12 While I consider the conception of norms conferring 
competences other than legislative ones to be an important research 
achievement, I consider the conception of norms conferring legislative 
competences to be unsustainable, because in this conception the legisla-
tive competence is conferred by provisions that are not norms. If that is 
the case, such provisions cannot exist in an act that contains only norms. 
Thus, the counterpart of this assumption proves to be superfluous. 
Clarification of the idealizing assumptions analyzed above enabled 
Nowak to formulate the following definition:
(D2)  if L is a perfect legislator 17, then the norm !(p/A,s) is 
valid in legal system Q at time t2 if and only if this norm 
was enacted by legislator L at time t1 not later than t2.
In many respects, this definition differs from the one I proposed. Although 
the expression “valid in …at…” as defined in D2 is also a triadic pred-
icate that denotes the relationship between a norm, a legal system and 
a time period, this definition also includes relativization to the legislator. 
The predecessor of this definition establishes his perfection. Therefore, 
it is not a normal definition, but a conditional definition. What is more, 
the right-hand argument of the consequent of the definition, which is the 
counterpart of definiens, stipulates the necessary condition for the validity 
of the norm, which is its enactment by the legislator. This condition raises 
a reservation, since it is normative acts that are enacted in this way, but not 
individual norms. A single norm could only be enacted if it were identical 
to a normative act, which almost never happens. Finally, in the right-hand 
argument of the consequent of D2, there is variable ‘L’, the range of which 
is a set of legislators, absent in the left-hand argument of this equivalence. 
This would necessitate its correction.
12 V. W. Patryas, Performatywy w prawie, Poznań 2005, pp. 79–87.
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SUMMARY
An Attempt to Formulate a Preliminary 
Defnition of the Validity of Norms
The aim of the study is to formulate a preliminary defnition of the va-
lidity of norms using idealization method for this purpose. The author 
proposes a pre liminary definition of the validity of norms and compares 
it with the con ception of such a definition put forward by Leszek Nowak 
in Interpretacja prawnicza. Studium z metodologii prawoznawstwa. 
Keywords: theory of law, validity of norms, idealization method.
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